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Abstract: Both the traditional Aris-
totelian and modern symbolic ap-
proaches to logic have seen logic in 
terms of discrete symbol processing. 
Yet there are several kinds of argu-
ment whose validity depends on 
some topological notion of continu-
ous variation, which is not well cap-
tured by discrete symbols. Examples 
include extrapolation and slippery 
slope arguments, sorites, fuzzy logic, 
and those involving closeness of 
possible worlds. It is argued that the 
natural first attempts to analyze 
these notions and explain their rela-
tion to reasoning fail, so that ignor-
ance of their nature is profound. 
  
 
Résumé: Les approches dans les 
logiques Aristotélicienne tradition-
nelle et symbolique décrivent la lo-
gique en termes de traitement des 
symboles discrets. Pourtant, il existe 
plusieurs types d'arguments dont la 
validité dépend d'une certaine notion 
topologique de la variation continue, 
ce qui n'est pas bien saisie par les 
symboles discrets. On inclut comme 
exemples, des extrapolations, des 
arguments de la pente glissante, des 
sorites, des arguments fondés sur la 
logique floue, et ceux impliquant la 
proximité des mondes possibles. On 
fait valoir que les premières tentati-
ves naturelles à analyser ces notions 
et à expliquer leur relation au rai-
sonnement échouent, et que l'igno-
rance de cet échec est profonde. 
 
Keywords: discrete and continuous, extrapolation arguments, fuzzy logic, 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Both traditional Aristotelian and modern symbolic logic regard 
logic as a discrete affair: discrete symbols are manipulated ac-
cording to formal rules. Even in the wider field of “informal 
logic,” it is regarded as an advance when there is movement to-
wards formalization in discrete symbols and rules such as the 
syllogism or modus ponens, or discrete diagrams of argument 
structure. Topological notions like continuous variation or 
closeness are generally presumed to have no essential place in 
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logic, in the way they do in the study of space, time and motion. 
Yet there seems no a priori reason why this should be so, nor 
are there arguments to this conclusion beyond vague assertions 
that concepts that do not have sharp limits are “meaningless 
from the logical point of view” (Frege 1980/1896: 115) or that 
formal manipulation of discrete atomic symbols is “the only 
scheme we have for capturing normative patterns of reasoning,” 
and that anything else would be unintelligible (Pylyshyn 1984: 
198, 51). Earlier times had no difficulty with the intelligibility of 
Euclidean geometry, long the paradigm of logical inference, 
whose reasonings involved essential reference to diagrams in 
continuous space (Greaves 2001: Ch. 3). If logic studies either 
the laws that thought should follow, or the relations between ab-
stract entities such as propositions, no reason is immediately ap-
parent why the processing of discrete symbols should be ex-
pected to capture all the relevant structure.  
 Further, there are many kinds of arguments which do de-
pend critically on some notion of continuous variation. 
Let us take a simple example. The transitivity of identity is cap-
turable in discrete symbols. For example: 
 
Crimson is the RGB color (RGB: 211, 0, 63). 
(RGB: 211, 0, 63) is the same as (Hex: #D3003F). 
Therefore crimson is (Hex: #D3003F). 
 
However if we weaken identity to similarity,1 continuity enters 
the picture: 
 
Crimson is very like scarlet. 
Scarlet is very like vermilion. 
Therefore, crimson is somewhat like vermilion. 
 
The validity of the argument plainly depends on “likeness,” un-
like identity, being subject to continuous variation and coming 
in (not necessarily numerical) degrees or gradations. Likeness 
thus works like closeness in space: if x is very close to y and y is 
very close to z, x is not far from z. That is inherent in the notions 
of likeness and closeness.2                                                                     
1 The debate on whether similarity is partial identity (surveyed in Morganti 
2011) need not be resolved here; it is sufficient that similarity resembles 
identity. 
2 It may be said that the structure of the concepts ought to be laid out explic-
itly, and if they are then the original arguments are enthymemes. That is so 
but is no more than can be said of many other arguments, such as “x is before 
y and y is before z, therefore x is before z” (depending on the transitivity of 
“before”) or “Tweety is a canary and birds fly, therefore Tweety flies” (de-
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 It could be doubted whether similarity is “really logic” and 
thus whether arguments involving similarity should be counted 
as truly logical. That would be a sterile debate in the absence of 
any agreement as to what the limits of logic are (Haack 1978: 
Chs 1 and 9; Sher 1991: Chs 1 and 3) or even agreement as to 
whether logic with identity is truly logic. It is at least true that 
similarity, like identity, is a very general and “topic neutral” no-
tion, crucial to argumentation across an indefinitely broad range 
of subject matters. The same is true of the various notions exam-
ined below. 
 We survey a number of fields where continuity is crucial 
to argumentation, with brief commentary. It is not maintained 
that the same analysis should apply to all of them, but since the 
topic is unfamiliar, it is desirable that as varied a selection of 
examples as possible should be on the table before analysis be-
gins. There will then be less danger of painting oneself into a 
corner by becoming fixated on the special features of a single 
example. Naturally that necessitates some sacrifice of depth for 
breadth. That is inevitable in setting the scene and looking for 
commonalities across a range of examples. 
 The examples will be taken from slippery slope and ex-
trapolation arguments, possible worlds and counterfactuals, sori-
tes, fuzzy logic and classification, and probability and inductive 
logic. In all of these cases, reasoning essentially relies on some 
notion of gradual or continuous variation, some notion of close-
ness among abstract or logical entities. In each case the reader 
should ask, “In what space, exactly, is this variation?”  
 
 
2.  Slippery slope and extrapolation arguments 
 
The first example comes from slippery slope arguments—best 
known in applied ethics but not confined to that area. Walton’s 
Slippery Slope Arguments distinguishes three types. First, there 
is the “thin edge of the wedge” argument: that if some new and 
small step is taken, it will create a precedent and “all hell will 
break loose.” Insiders of academic politics will recognize the 
analysis in Cornford’s Microcosmographia Academica: 
 
The Principle of the Wedge is that you should not act 
justly now for fear of raising expectations that you may 
act still more justly in the future—expectations which 
you are afraid you will not have the courage to satisfy ... 
The Principle of the Dangerous Precedent is that you                                                                                                                                                   
pending on the classification of canaries). The issue is that the structure of 
the concepts in the example does involve continuous variation. 
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should not now do an admittedly right action for fear you, 
or your equally timid successors, should not have the 
courage to do right in some future case, which, ex hy-
pothesi, is essentially different, but superficially resem-
bles the present one. Every public action which is not 
customary, either is wrong, or, if it is right, is a dangerous 
precedent. It follows that nothing should ever be done for 
the first time. (Cornford 1953: 15) 
 
 The second type of argument distinguished by Walton is 
close to the sorites, of which more later. It argues that “There is 
no cutoff point,” no natural boundary for the application of a 
vague term. It has been argued, for example, that there is no 
natural point in time between conception and birth at which a 
baby becomes human, so that a right to life should be extended 
to it immediately upon conception.  
 A third type of argument argues that a contemplated action 
would trigger a cascading series of effects that lead to disaster. 
The domino theory of the advance of Communism is an exam-
ple, and forward defence the conclusion generally advocated. It 
is possible to combine all three kinds, as is usual in the euthana-
sia debate. There is the precedent problem, the fuzzy boundaries 
of notions like “human,” “alive” and “voluntary,” and the Nazi 
analogy of an actual causal series of events that led from eutha-
nasia to disaster (Walton 1992: 2-6; similar in Lamb 1998: Ch. 
1; Govier 1982; Burgess 1993; Lode 1999; Schubert 1994; a 
negative view in Spielthenner 2010; doubts on the Nazi analogy 
in Hanauskeabel 1996). 
 Slippery slope arguments have sometimes been classified 
as fallacies. That is not in general correct, as is widely agreed in 
the applied ethics literature. The foundation of their effective-
ness is that there really is a closeness relation between precedent 
and precedent, embryo-stage and embryo-stage, domino and 
domino, leading to the reasonableness of the inference that 
whatever applies to one precedent (domino, event) applies 
equally well (or almost equally well, or to some degree as well) 
to a nearby one. There is no agreement, however, as to how 
much they are worth. Obviously they may be overcome by evi-
dence, such as reasons for thinking that a Nazi-like series of 
events “couldn’t happen here.” But defeasibility by further evi-
dence is a feature of any non-deductive inference. The question 
remains, how strong is a given slippery slope argument in the 
absence of countervailing evidence, and how much evidence 
would be needed to overcome it?  
 If such arguments were used only in applied ethics, there 
might not be any strong motivation to examine them strictly as 
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logic. But very similar extrapolation arguments appear in phi-
losophy and in science, and important conclusions sometimes 
hang on them.3 An example is the argument from microscopes 
for realism about the sub-microscopic. We tend to believe in the 
real existence of new things we see through magnifying glasses, 
because of the continuity with what we see with the naked eye. 
D.M. Armstrong argues: 
  
We would trust these new deliverances because we had 
been able to check the native eye to some extent. We 
could then substitute a more powerful glass, checking its 
reliability by reference back to the original glass; and so 
proceed by easy stages to the most powerful microscope. 
(Armstrong 1961: 159-60; a similar argument of Quin-
ton’s defended in Chibeni 2006)  
 
There has been little discussion of this argument for realism, 
though there is sometimes noted the weaker argument that if one 
wishes to give a different status to “the observed” and “the un-
observed,” it is hard to draw the line between them. Another 
philosophical example is the argument that science has gradu-
ally purged the mystical from explanations of lightning and 
other physical phenomena, then of life, and can therefore be ex-
pected to conquer the last bastion of occultist explanation, the 
mind (Dennett 1994). 
 But perhaps the best reason for taking such arguments 
seriously as logic is that convincing examples occur in core sci-
entific inference. Armstrong’s argument concerns the extension 
of scientific as much as philosophical knowledge, and in modern 
Big Science there is often a question of cantilevering a series of 
instruments or methods of measurement out into the unknown. 
Red shift methods for measuring astronomical distances are 
checked against parallax methods for close stars and brightness-
based methods for close galaxies. The agreement in the regions 
of overlap promotes confidence in the methods for more distant 
objects. Unfortunately the overlap of the methods is small, and 
there was concern about a “gap” between nearby galaxies, 
whose distances are pinned down by several methods, and the 
more distant galaxies, where relative distances are easy to find 
but absolute ones have been doubtful. It is claimed that recent 
work with the Hubble telescope has succeeded in plugging the 
gap (Di Benedetto 2002; Mould and Sakai 2008). 
                                                                    
3 This is not the same issue as extrapolation in the sense of transferring the 
results of medical experiments on animals to humans, or other such examples 
of transfer of causal mechanisms, as discussed in Steel 2007. 
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 Similar considerations apply to methods of dating ancient 
objects, such as calibrating carbon-14 dating against uranium-
thorium results and those from counting tree-rings (the “German 
absolute oak chronology”) (van der Pflicht 2004). It is obvious 
that it is not simply a matter of deciding on the reliability of a 
new method in a yes-or-no fashion. However well a new method 
agrees with old ones in the region where they both apply, doubt 
accrues to the new method as it extrapolates further out into the 
unknown. But that doubt may be lessened by increasing the area 
of overlap, and by bringing more methods, even if unreliable 
ones, to bear.  
 A similar argument is crucial to Darwin’s theory at one of 
its weakest points. While there is plenty of evidence for the long 
development of species and their common descent, the evidence 
that chance variation with natural selection is the sole or main 
driving force is much thinner. There is no doubt that this mech-
anism can cause some changes in a population, but can it, and 
does it, cause speciation? Darwin argued that observed artificial 
selection over short time intervals can be scaled up to explain 
changes as large as those from one species to another. That is 
not an observed result, nor is it an argument from analogy; it is 
an argument from continuity, an extrapolation. Darwin under-
stood how crucial the extrapolation was to his argument, which 
is why the first two chapters of The Origin of Species are en-
tirely devoted to it. Before natural selection or homologies are 
even mentioned, there are many pages of mind-numbing detail 
about the descent of the varieties of domestic pigeon, designed 
to demonstrate that “domestic races of the same species differ 
from each other in the same manner as, only in most cases in a 
lesser degree than, do closely-allied species of the same genus in 
a state of nature” (Darwin 1859: 78). In recent times, Stephen 
Jay Gould has again recognized this as a crucial but relatively 
weak link in Darwinism, and has doubted it. He writes, “The 
modern synthesis drew most of its direct conclusions from stud-
ies of local populations and their immediate adaptations. It then 
extrapolated the postulated mechanism of these adaptations—
gradual, allelic substitutions—to encompass all larger scale 
events. The synthesis is now breaking down ...” (Gould 1980: 
121). Other extrapolation arguments relied on widely in biology 
include those inferring the danger of low doses of carcinogens 
from observations on high doses (Bolt et al 2009). 
 Extrapolation arguments have a resemblance to the poor 
cousin of Mill’s Methods, the Method of Concomitant Vari-
ations (Mill 1872: 460-70). It has been the least discussed, al-
though it is obviously the strongest. A classic use by Galileo 
shows its strength and weaknesses, as well as the essential role 
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played in it by continuous variation. He is arguing that the Co-
pernican system has spheres moving more slowly the farther 
they are from the sun, whereas the Ptolemaic system has to 
break that pattern suddenly by having the most distant sphere, 
that of the fixed stars, rotate once a day.  
 
The improbability is shown for a third time in the relative 
disruption of the order which we surely see existing 
among those heavenly bodies whose circulation is not 
doubtful, but most certain. The order is such that the 
greater orbits complete their revolutions in longer times, 
and the lesser in shorter: thus, Saturn, describing a greater 
circle than the other planets, completes it in 30 years; Ju-
piter revolves in its smaller one in 12 years, Mars in 2; 
the moon covers its much smaller circle in a single 
month. And we see no less sensibly that of the satellites 
of Jupiter the closest one to that planet makes its revolu-
tion in a very short time, that is in about 42 hours; the 
next, in three and a half days; the third in 7 days and the 
most distant in 16. And this very harmonious trend will 
not be a bit altered if the earth is made to move on itself 
in twenty-four hours. But if the earth is desired to remain 
motionless, it is necessary, after passing from the brief 
period of the moon to the consecutively larger ones, and 
ultimately to that of Mars in 2 years, and the greater one 
of Jupiter in 12, and from this to the still larger one of 
Saturn whose period is 30 years – it is necessary, I say, to 
pass on beyond to another incomparably larger sphere, 
and make this one finish an entire revolution in twenty-
four hours. (Galileo 1967/1632: 118-9) 
 
 Modern statistics has rechristened some of the simpler ex-
trapolation methods “extreme value theory,” and used them with 
some success to predict, for example, flood peaks outside the 
range of data so far observed (Reiss and Thomas 2001). It is still 
true that the results become more unreliable as one moves fur-
ther beyond the data; for example, given fifty years of data, a 
prediction of a once-in-a-thousand-year flood is much less se-
cure than the prediction of a once-in-a-hundred-year flood. 
 In these scientific examples, it is clear what is the space in 
which variation occurs—in chronology it is time (and closeness 
of tree-rings which is presumed to reflect closeness in time), in 
Darwin’s extrapolation it is the closeness of species in “feature 
space” or number of important shared characteristics, and so on. 
That does not cast much light on how the strength of the argu-
ments relates to variation in those spaces. By and large, greater 
closeness in the space gives a stronger argument, but it remains 
unclear how much, or why. 
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3.  Conditionals and closeness of possible worlds 
 
The next example of continuous variation in logic comes from 
the theory of possible worlds. A popular analysis of counterfac-
tual conditionals like “If kangaroos had no tails, they would 
topple over,” is, “In all possible worlds close to the present one, 
in which the antecedent holds, the consequent also holds.” The 
question is, how much weight rests on the notion of “closeness” 
of worlds, how does one analyze it, and how does one know 
about it? David Lewis explains why closeness of worlds is cru-
cial to the analysis:  
 
‘If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over’ is true 
(or false, as the case may be) at our world, quite without 
regard to those possible worlds where kangaroos walk 
around on crutches, and stay upright that way. Those 
worlds are too far away from ours. What is meant by the 
counterfactual is that, things being pretty much as they 
are—the scarcity of crutches for kangaroos being pretty 
much as it actually is, the kangaroos’ inability to use 
crutches being pretty much as it actually is, and so on—if 
kangaroos had no tails they would topple over.  
 We might think it best to confine our attention to 
worlds where kangaroos have no tails and everything else 
is as it actually is; but there are no such worlds. Are we to 
suppose that kangaroos have no tails but that their tracks 
in the sand are still as they actually are? Then we shall 
have to suppose that these tracks are produced in a way 
quite different to the actual way. Are we to suppose that 
kangaroos have no tails but that their genetic makeup is 
as it actually is? Then we shall have to suppose that genes 
control growth in a way quite different from the actual 
way (or else that there is something, unlike anything 
there actually is, that removes the tails). And so it goes; 
respects of similarity and difference trade off. If we try 
too hard for exact similarity to the actual world in one re-
spect, we will get excessive differences in some other re-
spect (Lewis 1973: 8-9).  
 
Lewis did not initially give much analysis of the “similarity met-
ric” involved in the closeness of worlds, but in response to ob-
jections later developed some suggestions on what features are 
important. He agreed that similarity might sometimes be relative 
to context, but maintained that in general, for example, a large-
scale violation of laws of nature resulted in much more dissimi-
larity than any small change in a particular fact (Lewis 1979). 
 It has also been plausibly argued that a closeness-of-
possible-worlds analysis is appropriate also for indicative condi-
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tionals—for example, that we distinguish the indicative condi-
tional “If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, someone else did,” from 
the counterfactual “If Oswald had not killed Kennedy then 
someone else would have” merely by the set of possible worlds 
we hold constant (Nolan 2003). Since nothing is more funda-
mental to logic than ‘if,’ a topological notion has here pen-
etrated the heart of logic. 
 Notions of closeness also appear in discussion of the 
“truthlikeness” or “approach to truth” of scientific theories (Ni-
iniluoto 1987: Ch. 10.3; Kuipers 1992) and in certain treatments 
of global philosophical scepticism, especially Nozick’s. He re-
quires that knowledge of a proposition p should track p, but only 
in “close” worlds, not in distant ones like vat worlds (Nozick 
1981: 240-3). He does not provide any analysis of closeness.  
 
 
4.  Sorites, vagueness and fuzzy logic  
 
The first irruption of the continuous into logic occurred in the 
sorites “paradox” of the ancients. It has long stood as the stan-
dard and prominent example of the difficulty that discrete logic 
has in dealing with continuous variation. A heap of, say, grains 
of sand is still a heap if one grain is removed. But if one applies 
that rule many times, one ends up with a falsity, since having 
removed a sufficient number of grains, one will no longer have a 
heap. The problem is now studied in philosophy under the rubric 
of “vagueness” (Black 1970; Williamson 1994; Sorensen 
2012/1997: section 3, with many references), in law under 
“open texture” and in other disciplines as “fuzzy logic.” The 
idea in each case is that many words of natural language, like 
“heap,” “tall,” “reasonable” and so on admit of borderline cases, 
and even definite cases of them can be more or less central. So 
removing one grain from a heap cannot make it a non-heap, but 
it can make it (slightly) less centrally a heap, that is, move it to-
wards the borderline (itself imprecise) of heapness.  
 There is a range of philosophical approaches to the ques-
tion (Hyde 2011/1997). But the main ones agree that the prob-
lem arises from a mismatch between the discreteness of lan-
guage (“a heap” versus “not a heap”) and the near-continuous 
nature of what it describes (masses of grains of many different 
numbers). The definiteness of “heap” and “not-heap” does not 
match anything in the real-world referent. Wherever a con-
tinuum without natural boundaries is to be cut up into a discrete 
spectrum, a mismatch and an arbitrariness in the boundaries is 
inevitable. That is particularly clear in the formalization of the 
sorites that asks: if one grain is not a heap and very many grains 
  James Franklin 
 
© James Franklin. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2013), pp. 33-56.  
42 
are a heap, for what number n exactly is it true that n grains are 
a not a heap and n+1 grains are? (Rescher 2008). Philosophical 
disagreement is mainly over whether the discrete-continuous 
mismatch should be thought of primarily as semantic, epistemo-
logical or ontological. 
 The sorites paradox illustrates the perils of concentrating 
on the theoretical aspects of a single example. Even if the philo-
sophical issues were resolved, it would not help with formaliz-
ing inference with vague or fuzzy concepts. More detail is 
needed in cognitive science and artificial intelligence, where the 
aim is to represent fuzzy or vague predicates, for the purpose of 
performing inference with them in such areas as the natural lan-
guage querying of databases. If a computer system is to respond 
appropriately to a question like “Give me the employees with 
fairly high salary,” it will need to represent somehow the differ-
ence between central and borderline cases of “high,” said of 
salaries, and how a modifier like “fairly” acts. The most com-
mon approach is the fuzzy logic one of assigning a “degree of 
membership” function which takes the value 1 on central mem-
bers of the concept, 0 on central non-members, and values be-
tween 0 and 1 to describe how well a borderline case matches 
the concept (McNeill and Freiburger 1993). Questions arise 
such as where one is to get the actual values from, whether the 
values are themselves precise or fuzzy, and so on.  
 As remarked above, there are important examples in ap-
plied ethics. In another area of application, the question “Where 
do you draw the line?” which is often used rhetorically, is taken 
seriously, and answered, in law. It is worth surveying briefly the 
legal situation, since the law is required to reach solutions to real 
problems as they arise, and cannot afford the professional de-
featism of philosophy. Since decisions must be reached, and 
must be reached in a manner that is reasonably consistent across 
cases, “drawing the line” is a matter of everyday occurrence in 
the courts (typical examples in Eveleth 1988; Gostin 1993; 
Spellman 1987), though the principles by which it is done are a 
matter of controversy. Legal decision-making, it is agreed, deals 
with “open-textured” concepts (legal jargon for fuzzy or vague). 
H.L.A. Hart’s Concept of Law explains the “fringe of vague-
ness” as the reason why expressing laws in rules cannot make 
them determinate in all cases:  
 
In all fields of experience, not only that of rules, there is a 
limit, inherent in the nature of language, to the guidance 
which general language can provide. There will indeed be 
plain cases constantly recurring in similar contexts to 
which general expressions are clearly applicable (‘If any-
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thing is a vehicle a motor-car is one’) but there will also 
be cases where it is not clear whether they apply or not 
(‘Does “vehicle” used here include bicycles, airplanes, 
roller skates?’) The latter are fact-situations, continually 
thrown up by nature or human invention, which possess 
only some of the features of the plain case but others 
which they lack ... Faced with the question whether the 
rule prohibiting the use of vehicles in the park is applic-
able in some combination of circumstances in which it 
appears indeterminate, all that the person called upon to 
answer can do is to consider (as does one who makes use 
of a precedent) whether the present case resembles the 
plain case ‘sufficiently’ in ‘relevant’ respects. The discre-
tion left to him by language may be very wide; so that if 
he applies the rule, the conclusion, even though it may 
not be arbitrary or irrational, is in effect a choice. He 
chooses to add to a line of cases a new case because of 
resemblances which can reasonably be defended as both 
legally relevant and sufficiently close. (Hart 1961: 120-4; 
also Bix 1991; Endicott 2000; Margalit 1979)  
 
Problems of this kind have been with the law for a long time, 
and one of the oldest problems is one of the most illuminating, 
because it involves a concept that seems paradigmatically natu-
ral and as precise as one could hope: that of “animal”. Since an-
cient times, it has been necessary legally to distinguish animals 
into “tame” (or “domestic”) and “wild” (ferae naturae), the 
former being the responsibility of their owners if they damage 
something. The question arises in one of A.P. Herbert’s mislead-
ing cases, when someone throws snails over the neighbour’s 
fence, are snails ferae naturae? That is a joke, but the real prob-
lems that have arisen under the heading “What is an animal?” 
are hardly less bizarre. Bees are ferae naturae; when hived they 
become the qualified property of the person who hives them, but 
become ferae naturae again when they swarm. Parrots may be-
come, but young unacclimatized parrots are not, “domestic ani-
mals.” A performing bear is not a domestic animal, nor is a 
caged lion or a tame seagull used in a photographer’s business. 
The phrase “bird, beast or other animal, ordinarily kept in a state 
of confinement” includes a ferret (James 1986: articles ‘Ani-
mal’, ‘Domestic animal’, ‘Ferae naturae’). The problem is a se-
rious obstruction to any attempt at a true formalization of legal 
thought, as would be necessary to achieve legal reasoning by 
computer (Dayal and Moles 1993; Franklin 2012).  
 Traditional logic textbooks often began with a discussion 
of “genus and species.” There was some reason for that, since 
the terms that are the elements of propositions are the result of a 
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prior logical operation of classification. Whether classification 
of individuals into kinds is a discrete or continuous matter has 
important consequences. (Can a foetus become a human gradu-
ally, for example?) Aristotle has been criticized for delaying 
theories of evolution by imposing a doctrine of discrete, fixed 
and immovable species on the living world. That is the opposite 
of what Aristotle actually said, since he admitted continuous 
variation between species, even between (simple) plants and 
animals (Franklin 1986). Nevertheless, the historical mistake 
itself is instructive, a symptom of endless tension over whether 
classification should be discrete via trees (like Porphyry’s tree, 
or Linnaeus’), with the tree dividing on one attribute at a time, 
or via a mix of features with various weights. The latter ap-
proach inevitably leads to problems with borderline cases, and 
one is led to picture the space of possible species as a multidi-
mensional continuous space of features, rather than as some-
thing discrete like a tree. Psychological experiments on which 
style of classification humans use have yielded ambiguous re-
sults, but with at least a substantial element of a mix of features 
and a continuous spread of categories from exemplars (Estes 
1994). A logic based on an assumed discrete classification struc-
ture of terms will miss something essential about human reason-
ing. 
 
 
5.  Logical probability with quantitative predicates 
 
The need for topological considerations in logical spaces is 
nicely illustrated by an example which is common in the folk-
lore on inductive logic (Franklin 2001; similar examples in 
Swinburne 1971: 326-7; Howson and Urbach 1993: 129; an an-
cient example in Diodorus Siculus: Bk. 3 Chs 36-7). Normally, 
instances of a generalization are taken to confirm it; even among 
inductive sceptics, they are not usually taken to disconfirm it. 
Consider, however, the generalization, “All humans are less 
than 5 meters tall.” This is confirmed by present observations of 
people, all of whom have been observed to be less than 5 meters 
tall. Suppose that an expedition returns from a previously unex-
plored jungle and credibly reports that they have observed a 
human 4.99 meters tall. On the total evidence after this discov-
ery, the probability that all people are less than 5 metres tall is 
nearly zero, although the generalization still has only positive 
instances, and in fact has more positive instances than it did be-
fore.  
 The lesson of the example is surely not that there is some-
thing wrong with confirmation by instances, but that informa-
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tion relevant to the probability is hidden in the structure of the 
concepts being used. Length, as everyone who uses the concept 
knows, is something that admits of continuous variation, which 
means that the existence of something 4.99 meters tall makes it 
probable that there is a similar thing at least 5 meters tall. There 
is no justification for pretending not to know that fact, on the 
grounds that logic ought to be formal (that is, that instance con-
firmation ought to apply in the same way for all concepts irre-
spective of their logical structure). The dogma that logic is for-
mal has enough difficulties even in deductive logic (for exam-
ple, one cannot substitute in inference schemas such as modus 
ponens concepts that have deductive-logical oddities, such as 
being inconsistent or self-referential, Stove 1986: ch. 10). Nor 
can one apply logical probability blindly, or formally, just be-
cause it is logic, and treat concepts that have probabilistic-
logical complexity as if they were simple. “Green,” “grue” and 
“less than 5 meters tall” have different logical structures, which 
can result in their behaving differently with respect to logical 
probability. If logic is to analyze real arguments, it must analyze 
the concepts used in them in enough detail to capture the infer-
ence. 
 Of course, the whole of non-deductive logic involves con-
tinuous variation, namely the variation in the strength with 
which one proposition can support another. It is hard to escape 
the conclusion that this is one reason why symbol-fixated logi-
cians have tried so hard to avoid admitting that non-deductive 
logic really is logic, despite the strength of the reasons for doing 
so (for example, that it works with the strength of conjectures in 
pure mathematics, which is true in all possible worlds, Franklin 
1987; general defence of non-deductive logic in Stove 1970). 
There is even a continuity argument as to why non-deductive 
inference should be regarded as strictly logic: if the relation be-
tween “All men are mortal and Socrates is a man” and “Socrates 
is mortal” is a matter of logic, the same ought to be true of the 
relation between “99% of men are mortal and Socrates is a man” 
and “Socrates is mortal.”  
 A final example in non-deductive inference is the tangled 
matter of Ockham’s Razor and inference to the best explanation. 
Simplicity is a property of theories in which there can presum-
ably be continuous variation, even if measuring it is notoriously 
difficult. And it has been remarked that a paranoid fantasy is 
very like an inference to the best explanation, but with too much 
“explained” (Lipton 1991: 62). That suggests that there is some 
kind of continuous parameter measuring how eager one is to 
find patterns in events. Paranoiacs have it set too high, so that 
they see everything as part of a conspiracy. It must be possible 
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to have it set too low, causing one to see history as “just one 
damn thing after another.” If one’s parameter is properly tuned, 
one will be ready to fit things into an explanatory pattern, but 
not more ready than is reasonable. An approximately correct 
tuning will be essential to good reasoning. 
 That completes the survey of examples where the strength 
of inferences depends essentially on some notion of continuous 
variation. 
 
 
6.  Understanding continuous variation in logical spaces 
 
How well do we understand such examples? How well do we 
need to understand them? What are the right questions to ask 
about continuous variation in logical spaces?  
 At one extreme, if one’s aim is to produce a working 
computer-based system to, say, perform legal reasoning, or in-
terpret natural language for the purpose of querying a database, 
then one needs to understand examples like the above extremely 
well and in fine detail. It will be necessary to consider how to 
elicit from humans their methods of performing their balancing 
acts with competing considerations, how to represent in the 
computer system the continuous variation required, and how to 
reason with it. It is a tall order. Things are not much better from 
a cognitive science viewpoint. There, one must explain how 
humans actually do manage to reason in these areas. It is very 
difficult to believe that they could do so by processing discrete 
uninterpreted symbols, according to the programme of “sym-
bolic AI” (McCorduck 2004: chs 6 and 11). There are of course 
ways of translating reasoning in continuous spaces into symbol 
transformations—that can be accomplished by co-ordinatizing 
the real line with infinite decimals, and it can be made to work 
in computer graphics. Still, it is not done easily, and the usual 
result is a very large number of symbols to manipulate. Sym-
bolic AI may be able to explain plausibly how it could be done 
by the brain, but it will take a lot of work, and there is little evi-
dence of a reasonable plan of attack yet. There is more hope in 
the approach to reasoning through “mental models” (Johnson-
Laird and Byrne 1991). A mental model at least could be some-
thing that admits of continuous variation, if the mind has some 
kind of mental visualization facility, which allows the drawing 
of pictures in which spatial relations can be represented. Such a 
facility, called the “imagination”, was presumed to exist in older 
philosophy and cognitive theory (Franklin 2000). It suffered 
temporary eclipse in the mid-twentieth century, with Ryle, for 
instance, pronouncing “There are no such things as mental pic-
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tures” (Ryle 1949: 254). But it has reappeared in psychology, 
and has had some exposure in philosophy in the “imagery de-
bate” (Tye 1991; Blachowicz 1997; Burnett 2004).  
 At the other extreme (“extreme” in what space?), one may 
ask for a philosophical or logical in-principle understanding of 
what is happening in these kinds of argument. It is tempting to 
retreat to talk of “pragmatics” and “social practices”, as if talk 
about continuous variation is purely a matter of socially-
constructed metaphor used for dialectical moves in “practical 
reasoning”. That is the view taken in Walton’s Slippery Slope 
Arguments. He argues that such arguments are “pragma-
dialectical” moves designed to shift the burden of presumption, 
in “interactive argumentation governed by collaborative rules of 
politeness in speech-act conversational exchanges” (Walton 
1992: 17, 20). A similar approach is taken by Stalnaker to the 
closeness of possible worlds. Deciding which changes to a 
world count as small, he says, depends on “vague conditions 
which are largely dependent on pragmatic considerations for 
their application” (Stalnaker 1981: 46).  
 If the pragmatic approach were essentially correct, there 
might be little to say about the subject from a strictly logical 
point of view.  
 Now, it can hardly be denied that the way we use counter-
factuals, for example, is dependent to some extent on human 
interests. When we consider a world in which “things are a little 
different,” it does not matter to us whether there are a few more 
or less galaxies in distant space, although those changes may be 
in some absolute sense large. But to stop there is to avoid the 
interesting questions. Compare the analysis of the word ‘tool.’ 
Undoubtedly, what is classified as a tool is relative to human 
interests, but to say that and no more avoids the interesting ques-
tions about the objective properties of a given material that ren-
der an object made from that material useful as a tool for one 
purpose but not for another. The same applies to slippery slope 
arguments. What is it about the arguments themselves that 
makes them apt for use in dialectical or practical reasoning? 
Doubtless who is called “tall” and who “short” is to some extent 
relative to our interests, but it is an objective fact that height of 
people is a property that varies continuously (in one dimension), 
and there is no sharp divide in the population. With possible 
worlds, we may warp the underlying space to give prominence 
to changes that are of special concern to us, but what is the pre-
existing structure of the underlying space being warped? It is an 
objective fact that a world in which kangaroos have no tails is 
closer to ours than a world in which all animals have no tails; no 
amount of warping in pursuit of special interests will make it 
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otherwise. More seriously, talking about “praxis” and “interests” 
gives us no insight into the extrapolation arguments in science, 
like the argument to realism from microscopes. These are prima 
facie logically similar to slippery slope arguments, and hence 
should be presumed to require the same analysis unless there is 
reason to think otherwise. The microscope argument supports 
realism about the sub-microscopic to the degree it does, irre-
spective of anyone’s interests, and we would like to know what 
that degree is and why. Similarly, we wish to know the objective 
reliability of our extrapolations in cosmic distances and ancient 
chronologies. The question remains, do we understand the un-
derlying objective variation in logical spaces, and how it bears 
on the logical force of arguments?  
 If “understand” implies an ability to formalize, it seems 
that we know very little. Neither of the two standard formaliza-
tions of continuous variation provided by mathematics, metric 
spaces and topological spaces, seems adequate. A space is a 
metric space if there exists a function d from pairs of points in 
the space to the real numbers (which one thinks of as the dis-
tance between the points), which satisfies:  
 
d(x,y) = d(y,x) 
d(x,z) ≤ d(x,y) + d(y,z) 
d(x,y) = 0 if and only if x = y.  
 
This formalism works very well for “really spatial” spaces, like 
the 3-dimensional space we live in, and the “space” of cosmic 
distances and ancient dates. It may be adequate for such non-
spatial “spaces” as the spaces of perceived colours or of proba-
bilities. But it is too strong for many of the cases at hand. One 
has no idea whether it is possible to find an exact distance be-
tween one possible world and the next (Lewis’s talk of a “simi-
larity metric” is not intended to indicate a real quantitative met-
ric), much less one that is guaranteed to satisfy the triangle in-
equality (the second axiom above). If it does exist, there seems 
no non-arbitrary way of measuring it. And even if it did exist, it 
seems unnecessary to explain the possibility of the loose con-
tinuous reasoning about similarity of worlds that is actually per-
formed.  
 On the other hand, the axioms for a topological space ap-
pear to be too weak. A set is said to be a topological space if 
there exists a set of subsets of it (the “open sets”), which con-
tains the whole set, the empty set, and is closed under taking un-
ions and under taking finite intersections. Topological spaces 
that are intended to describe some notion of continuity are also 
normally Hausdorff spaces, satisfying the extra axiom that for 
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every pair of points, there exist open sets containing each, which 
do not intersect (Dugundji 1966: 62, 137). One may well feel 
that one can recognize an open set in the space of possible 
worlds: probably the set of possible worlds which differ mini-
mally from the present world except for making Alice smaller 
and smaller (without vanishing) is open. Unfortunately, that is 
very little help in deciding on the closeness of worlds. Since 
worlds can differ in many respects, it is necessary to ask which 
dimensions of variation are important, so as to be able to com-
pare a large variation in one dimension with a small change in 
another, possibly more important, dimension. It is impossible 
even to ask these questions within the framework of topological 
spaces, since they do not support a notion of a “small” versus 
“large” change, or any comparison of dimensions.  
 One would like, then, some notion stronger than a topo-
logical space, but weaker than a metric space. There is some 
non-standard mathematical machinery available, such as fuzzy 
metric spaces, but it has yet to prove itself in applications (Ka-
leva and Seikkala 1984). One problem that would appear to be 
difficult is comparing, in possible worlds, the variation of an 
object in some attribute, with the object’s vanishing.  
 Another approach that could be taken is to construct pos-
sible worlds sufficiently simple that the answers are obvious. In 
Carnapian worlds with a finite number of individuals, each with 
a finite set of attributes chosen from a finite number of catego-
ries, it is easy to say what possible worlds are. A possible world 
is a point in the grid of possible choices of the attributes for all 
individuals. The worlds closest to a given world will be the 
neighbouring points on the grid, those in which one attribute of 
one individual is changed. That looks simple enough, at first 
glance, but there are still several problems which suggest one is 
not as well informed as one first thought. Are some dimensions 
of variation more important than others? Does the grid have an 
edge, or does it come round on itself like a grid on a torus? And 
how should one compare changes in attributes with the going 
out of existence of an individual? More important, however, is 
the problem that the idealization involved in Carnapian worlds 
has removed by fiat those properties whose nature is to vary 
continuously, like length and shape. As Hart says, “This would 
be a world fit for ‘mechanical’ jurisprudence. Plainly, it is not 
our world.” (Hart 1961: 125) Variation in those respects cannot 
be represented in the discrete on-off style of the Carnapian 
worlds—and surely it is variation in those respects that is im-
portant to the topological structure of the possible worlds we 
wish to consider.  
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 Then, even if the formal structure of the relation of close-
ness were known, it would still be a further project to establish 
how to find it, that is, how to actually measure the closeness of 
worlds. And that would still leave undecided the question of 
how finely divisible any of these logical spaces is. The real 
numbers are infinitely divisible, physical space may be as well, 
and one at least knows how to approach deciding whether it is or 
not; but for logical spaces there seems little hint as to where to 
start. 
 Even if the problem of defining and measuring distances 
in the underlying space was solved (as it is solved in cases of 
extrapolation arguments based on distance or time, such as with 
cosmic distances and ancient chronology calibration), there re-
mains the problem of evaluating how the strength of the argu-
ment depends on closeness in the space. That problem is very 
much unsolved. 
 The simplest case should be extrapolation arguments in 
one spatial dimension. One would expect that simplifying the 
problem sufficiently would lead to a problem solvable by stan-
dard statistical methods, but that is not the case. There is rel-
evant mathematical machinery, but it does not solve the original 
questions. The natural first problem to consider is extrapolation 
of a function fitted to data points. Interpolation (predicting 
values within the range of the data points) is reasonably well 
understood via methods such as data smoothing, but extrapola-
tion is much harder. John Stuart Mill justly remarked that many 
functional forms would give indistinguishable answers on data 
points (and on interpolated values), but would give wildly dif-
fering predictions outside that range (Mill 1872: 469). The prob-
lem remains unsolved. In general, without special knowledge of 
how the data is generated, extrapolation is regarded as unsafe. 
Press’s authoritative Numerical Recipes warns, “[except when 
solving differential equations] the dangers of extrapolation can-
not be overemphasized: An interpolating function, which is per-
force an extrapolating function, will typically go berserk when 
the argument x is outside the range of tabulated values by more 
than the typical spacing of tabulated points” (Press 1992: 107). 
Such across-the-board pessimism is not welcomed in the ever-
optimistic business world, where self-proclaimed experts have 
been ever ready to sell their services in “trend extrapolation” to 
predict the direction and scale of technological innovation 
(Bright and Shoeman 1973; Martino 1983, especially ch. 5; on 
the results see Schnaars 1989). A total pessimism is not possible 
in areas like nuclear power plant technology and greenhouse gas 
climate models, where there is no choice but to attempt infer-
ence from models calibrated on a system operating in a safe 
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range to the behavior of the system in a quite different, possibly 
unsafe regime (D’Auria et al 1995; official view on climate pro-
jection in IPCC 2007, especially FAQ 8.1). There is a good deal 
of engineering expertise in specific problems, but the upshot of 
those investigations is that extrapolation depends on knowledge 
of the particular problem. Tracking problems (to predict the 
paths of aircraft from their radar tracks, for example) require a 
smooth projection out from the existing track (Chui and Chen 
1991, Chs 1, 8), and the brain needs to implement some similar 
algorithm to predict the motion of things that its organism must 
avoid or catch (Nijhawan 1994; Mehta and Schaal 2002). On the 
other hand, predictions of signals or time series of economic da-
ta normally depend on a quite different idea, the discovery of 
periodicities in the observed portion (Wiener 1949: Ch. 2; Chat-
field 1994: Ch. 1 and section 2.6). Estimating the biodiversity of 
a large region from counting the species in a small subregion is 
a different problem again, made special by the fact that the data 
are distributed in space (Palmer et al. 2002; generally Haining 
2003). Yet another methodology applies to purely mathematical 
cases like predicting a limit from a series of successively better 
approximations to a result (Brezinski and Redivo Zaglia 1991). 
All in all, existing mathematics and statistics can give only the 
vaguest advice on extrapolation, and most of that advice consists 
in warnings. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
At the present stage, therefore, it must be concluded that even 
the simplest cases of arguments whose strength depends on 
some notion of continuous variation are very poorly understood. 
One must rest content with the purely Socratic pleasures of the 
realization that when it comes to any reasoning based on the 
continuous, there are more unsolved questions than previously 
thought. 
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